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This paper examines the effect of recommender systems on the diversity of sales. Two anecdotal views 
exist about such effects. Some believe recommenders help consumers discover new products and thus 
increase sales diversity. Others believe recommenders only reinforce the popularity of already popular 
products. This paper seeks to reconcile these seemingly incompatible views. We explore the question in 
two ways. First, modeling recommender systems analytically allows us to explore their path dependent 
effects. Second, turning to simulation, we increase the realism of our results by combining choice models 
with actual implementations of recommender systems. Our main result is that some well known 
recommenders can lead to a reduction in sales diversity. Because common recommenders (e.g., 
collaborative filters) recommend products based on sales and ratings, they cannot recommend products 
with limited historical data, even if they would be rated favorably. In turn, these recommenders can create 
a rich-get-richer effect for popular products and vice-versa for unpopular ones. This bias toward 
popularity can prevent what may otherwise be better consumer-product matches. That diversity can 
decrease is surprising to consumers who express that recommendations have helped them discover new 
products. In line with this, we show it is possible for individual-level diversity to increase but aggregate 
diversity to decrease. Recommenders can push each person to new products, but they often push similar 
users toward the same products. We show how basic design choices affect the outcome, and thus 
managers can choose recommender designs that are more consistent with their sales goals and consumers’ 
preferences.  
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1. INTRODUCTION
Media has historically been a “blockbuster” industry. Of the many products available, sales 
concentrate among a small number of hits. In recent years, such concentration has begun to decrease. The 
last ten years have seen an extraordinary increase in the number of products available (Brynjolfsson et al. 
2006; Clemons et al. 2006), and consumers have taken to these expanded offerings. It is believed this 
increased variety will allow consumers to obtain the ideal products for them, and if it continues could 
amount to a cultural shift from hit to niche products. One difficulty that arises, however, is how 
consumers will find such niche products among seemingly endless alternatives.  
Recommender systems are considered one solution to this problem. These systems use data on 
purchases, product ratings, and user profiles to predict which products are best suited to a particular 
customer. These systems are commonplace at major online firms such as Amazon, Netflix, and Apple’s 
iTunes Store. In author Chris Anderson’s view, “The main effect of filters, [which include online 
recommender systems], is to help people move from the world they know (‘hits’) to the world they don’t 
(‘niches’)” (2006, p. 109).  
Will recommenders make us all viewers of niche, independent movies and music? Or, might they 
actually reinforce the blockbuster nature of media? While recommenders have been assumed to push 
consumers toward the niches, we present an argument why some popular systems might do the opposite.2 
Anecdotes from users and researchers suggest recommenders help consumers discover new products, and 
thus increase sales diversity (Anderson 2006). A small number of others believe several recommender 
designs have the potential to lower diversity by reinforcing the position of already popular products 
(Mooney & Roy 2000; Fleder & Hosanagar 2007). This paper attempts to reconcile these seemingly 
incompatible views. Holding supply-side offerings fixed, we ask whether recommenders make media 
consumption more diverse or more concentrated. 
                                                                 
2 With so many different recommenders employed by firms, one cannot state a universal result for all. Instead this paper picks 
several recommenders we believe are commonly used in industry and focuses on them.  
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 We explore this question in two ways. First, modeling recommender systems analytically allows us 
to explore their path dependent effects. Second, using simulation, we increase the realism of our results 
by combining choice models with actual implementations of recommender systems. Our main result is 
that some popular recommenders can lead to a reduction in diversity. Because common recommenders 
(e.g., collaborative filters) recommend products based on sales or ratings, they cannot recommend 
products with limited historical data, even if they would be rated favorably. These recommenders create a 
rich-get-richer effect for popular products and vice-versa for unpopular ones. Several popular 
recommenders explicitly discount popular items, in an effort to promote exploration. Even so, we show 
this step may not be enough to increase diversity.  
That diversity can decrease is surprising to consumers who express that recommendations have 
helped them discover new products. The model provides two insights here. First, we find it is possible for 
individual-level diversity to increase but aggregate diversity to decrease. Recommenders can push each 
person to new products, but they often push similar users toward the same products. Second, if 
recommenders are replacing best-seller lists, diversity can increase by cutting out an even more 
popularity-biased tool; whereas relative to a world with neither, recommenders may lower diversity. 
The results have implications for firms and consumers. For retailers, we show how design choices 
affect sales and diversity. For consumers and niche content producers, we show how a recommender’s 
bias toward popular items can prevent what would otherwise be better consumer-product matches. We 
find that recommender designs that explicitly promote diversity may be more desirable. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews prior work. Section 3 gives a formal 
problem statement. Section 4 presents the analytic model, which is stylized but still able to show how 
sales information can bias recommenders. To increase the realism of our setting, and in particular 
incorporate actual recommender designs, a complementary simulation is developed in Sections 5-7. The 
simulation combines consumer choice models with actual recommender algorithms. Section 8 discusses 
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the implications for producer and consumer welfare. Section 9 concludes, reviewing the findings and 
offering directions for future work.  
2. PRIOR WORK 
Recommender systems help consumers learn of new products and select desirable products among 
myriad choices (Pham & Healey 2005). These systems can be seen as helping to automate the word of 
mouth process (Shardanand & Maes 1995; Resnick & Varian 1997; Dellarocas 2003). A simplified 
taxonomy divides recommenders into content-based versus collaborative filter-based systems. Content-
based systems use product information (e.g., author, genre, mood) to recommend items similar to those a 
user rated highly. Collaborative filters, in contrast, recommend what similar customers bought or liked. 
Perhaps the best-known collaborative filter is that seen on Amazon.com, with its familiar tagline, 
“Customers who bought this item also bought… .” The current work focuses on collaborative filters, 
which appear to be more common in industry.  
The design of these systems is an active research area. Reviews are provided in Breese et al. (1998) 
and Adomavicius and Tuzhilin (2005). For business contexts, Ansari et al. (2000) describes how firms 
can integrate other data sources (e.g., expert opinions) into recommendations. Work by Bodapati (2008) 
places recommender systems into a profit-maximizing framework. For industry applications, 
implementations at firms such as Amazon.com and CDNOW are described by Schafer et al. (1999), 
Sarwar et al. (2001), and Linden et al. (2003). While there is a large body of work on building these 
systems, we know much less about how they affect consumer choice and behavior. 
Studies have recently begun to examine individual-level, behavioral effects. In marketing, Senecal 
and Nantel (2004) show experimentally that recommendations do influence choice. They find that online 
recommendations can be more influential than human ones. Cooke et al. (2002) examine how purchase 
decisions under recommendations depend on the information provided, context, and familiarity. 
While the above studies ask how recommenders affect individuals, our interest is the aggregate effect 
they have on markets and society. In particular, we are interested in their effect on sales diversity. To the 
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best of our knowledge, there have not been formal studies isolating such effects, although the topic has 
received mention from several researchers. Brynjolfsson et al. (2007) find that a firm’s online sales 
channel has slightly higher diversity than its offline channel. They suggest demand-side causes, such as 
active tools (search engines) and passive tools (recommender systems), but do not isolate the specific 
effect of recommenders. In contrast, Mooney and Roy (2000) suggest collaborative filters may perpetuate 
homogeneity in choice, but it is an in-passing comment without formal study. 
Given our focus on aggregate effects, we would also like to highlight two related streams of work, 
namely those on information cascades and Internet Balkanization. The information cascades literature has 
looked at aggregate effects of observational learning and resulting convergence in behavior, or “herding” 
(Bikhchandani et al. 1998). The Internet balkanization literature has studied whether the Internet helps 
create a global community freed of geographic constraints. Van Alstyne and Brynjolfsson (2005) find that 
while increased integration or diversity can result, the Internet can also lead to greater Balkanization 
wherein groups with similar interests find each other and become more homogeneous. While our problem 
is different, we see these papers as complementary in highlighting the social implications of technologies 
that share information among users.  
This prior work reveals four themes. One, recommender systems research in the data mining literature 
has focused more on system design than understanding behavioral effects. Two, the marketing literature is 
just beginning to examine such behavioral effects. Three, of the existing behavioral work, the focus has 
been more on individual outcomes than aggregate effects. Four, regarding aggregate effects, there are 
opposing conjectures as to the effect of recommenders on sales diversity. 
3. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
This section sets the problem context, defines a measure of sales diversity, and formulates the question to 
be investigated. Our context is a market with a single firm selling one class of good (e.g., music versus 
movies). Within this one class, the firm can offer many items (e.g., CDs by thousands of artists). 
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3.1 Measure of Sales Diversity 
Before examining recommender systems’ effects, it is necessary to distinguish between sales and product 
diversity. Product diversity, or product variety, typically measures how many different products a firm 
offers. It is a supply-side measure of breadth. In contrast, we use sales diversity to describe the 
concentration of market shares conditional on firms’ assortment decisions. To measure sales diversity, we 
adopt the Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient is a common measure of distributional inequality and has 
been applied to many problems, the most common being perhaps wealth inequality. For additional 
discussion of this measure, see Sen (1976); for usage related to recommendations, see Oestreicher-Singer 
& Sundararajan (2006). 
Let L(u) be the Lorenz curve denoting the percentage of the firm’s sales generated by the lowest 
100u% of goods sold during a fixed time period. The Gini coefficient is defined ∫−= 1 0 )(21  : duuLG . 
Graphically this corresponds to G = A/(A+B) in Figure 1. Thus G ∈ [0,1], and it measures how much the 
Lorenz curve deviates from the 45° line. A value G = 0 reflects diversity (all products have equal sales), 
while values near 1 represent concentration (a small number of products account for most of the sales).  
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      Figure 1. Lorenz curve 
3.2 Problem Statement 
Consider a firm with I customers c1,… cI and J products p1,…, pJ. Define a recommender system as a 
function r that maps a customer ci and database onto a recommended product pj. Typically the database 
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records consumer purchases and/or ratings data. Consider next a set of different recommender systems 
r1,…,rk. Each ri reflects certain design choices. For example, ri might be a user-to-user collaborative filter, 
while rj might be Amazon.com’s item-to-item collaborative filter. Denote by G0 the Gini coefficient of the 
firm’s sales during a fixed time period in which a recommender system was not used. In contrast, let Gi be 
the Gini coefficient of the firm’s sales during a period in which recommender system ri was employed 
with all else equal.  
Definition. Recommender bias. Recommender ri is said to have a concentration bias, diversity bias, or no 
bias depending on the following conditions:  
⎪⎩
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For various recommenders, we examine whether a bias exists and its direction.  
4. ANALYTICAL MODEL 
This section presents an analytical model to explore a recommender system’s effects. We present a 
stylized model of a collaborative filter. The simple model illustrates how the use of sales information by 
recommender systems affects diversity. In Section 5, we consider more realistic specifications for the 
recommender and the consumer’s decision process. Throughout the paper, recommender system is 
synonymous with collaborative filter. Collaborative filters can operate on purchase or ratings data. To fix 
a context, our model considers purchases.  
4.1 Assumptions and Model 
We consider a set of customers making purchases sequentially. This section enumerates the assumptions 
defining the analytic model.  
Assumption 1. Each consumer buys one product per time step. The customer’s decision is which product 
to buy and not whether to buy. For example, at a streaming media service, this could reflect customers 
who have decided to listen to a personalized radio station for an hour and whose playlists are determined 
by the recommender. This assumption helps isolate choice from purchase incidence. 
  
7
 
Assumption 2. We assume there are only two products, w and b (white and black). This assumption is for 
tractability.  
Assumption 3. Consumers have purchase probabilities (p,1–p) for (w,b) in the absence of 
recommendations. We do not model the decision process that generates these purchase probabilities.  
Assumption 4. At each occasion, the firm recommends a product, which is accepted with probability r.  
Thus, r is the strength of the recommender.  
Assumption 5. The firm’s recommendation is generated using a function g(Xt) ∈ {w,b}, where Xt is the 
segment share of w just before purchase t. The recommender’s inputs are segment shares, market shares 
within a particular segment of similar users, and its output is a product recommendation. The system 
modeled recommends the product with higher segment share. This choice of g has a parallel with 
collaborative filters. Many collaborative filters find similar customer segments and recommend the most 
popular item within them (e.g., “people who bought X also bought Y”). This recommender can be 
represented by the step function 
 
g(Xt) := P(w recommended | Xt) = ⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
>
=
<
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 ,
   
1
0
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
t
t
t
X
X
X
 
(1) 
 
where Xt ∈ [0,1]. Figure 3 plots this. When Xt = ½ and the products have equal shares, the 
recommendation is determined by a Bernoulli(½) trial. To start, the recommender does not favor either 
product, and we assume X1 = ½ . 
Assumption 6. The segment of consumers constituting Xt is pre-selected and does not change over time. 
This segment of similar consumers is identified based on past behavior, possibly from purchases of 
products in other categories.  The assumption that the group does not evolve is for tractability, since such 
sequential user similarity (nearest-neighbor) calculations are difficult to model analytically. This 
assumption is for simplicity, but it does have a parallel with business practice. In industry, real-time 
updating of segments is often computationally prohibitive, and so many firms update segments 
periodically. Section 5 presents an alternate approach where we let the segments evolve over time. 
  
8
 
 The process defined by these assumptions can be illustrated by an urn model. Urn models are 
appealing for stochastic processes, and Johnson and Kotz (1977) show how many significant results from 
probability theory can be derived from such settings. Consider the two urn system of Figure 2. Urn 1 
contains balls representing products w and b. A fraction p of the balls in urn 1 are white; this fraction is 
the consumer’s purchase probability for w in the absence of recommendations. Urn 2 is the recommender: 
its contents reflect the sales history within the segment, and it produces recommendations according to 
g(Xt), where Xt is the fraction of w in urn 2 just before t. To start, urn 2 contains one w and one b. At time 
t=1, a ball is drawn with replacement from urn 1 representing the consumer’s choice before seeing the 
recommendation. Next, a ball is drawn with replacement from urn 2 according to g(Xt), representing the 
recommended product. With probability r, the consumer accepts the recommendation, and with 
probability (1–r) the consumer retains the original choice. The ball chosen represents the actual product 
purchased; afterward a copy of it is added to urn 2, which is equivalent to updating the recommender’s 
sales history (e.g., the firm’s database). Consumer 2 then arrives, and the process repeats (p and r are the 
same, but X2 is used instead of X1), and so on for other customers.  
From these assumptions, the probability that w is purchased at time t is  
 f(Xt) := P(w chosen on occasion t | Xt)  
  = p(1 – r) + g(Xt)r  
  
=
⎪⎩
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Figure 4 plots an example of f. The labels in (2) “l”, “m”, “h” are short-hand; they visually refer to the 
low (l), middle (m), and high (h) portion of f’s shape in Figure 4. The geometry of this figure helps 
illustrate the results derived next. 
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Figure 2. A two-urn model for recommender systems 
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Figure 3. Recommender g(Xt) Figure 4. Urn function f(Xt) and 45º line 
(p=0.7, r=0.5 example) 
  
4.2 Model Results 
Results are given in three parts. First we derive properties of market shares under recommendations. 
Second we show a graphical example. Third, we relate these market shares to the question of diversity. 
4.2.1 Theoretical results 
The following results are derived in a random walks framework by examining the difference w – b over 
time. For clarity, all proofs are in the appendix. 
Without recommendations, shares converge to (p, 1–p). The first proposition asks how this is affected 
by the presence of a recommender. As t→∞, {Xt} will converge to one of two values. These limiting 
values depend on the consumer’s initial p and recommender’s influence r and are given by  
Proposition 1. Support points. As t → ∞, Xt converges to  
  
10
 
 Case Support point 1 Support point 2 
1. )1/()( 2
1 rrp −−≤  l  n/a 
2. )1/()1/()( 2
1
2
1 rprr −<<−−  l  h  
3. )1/(2
1 rp −≥  h  n/a 
   
where the shorthand l and h are from equation (4), p ∈ [0,1], and r ∈ (0,1) (r = 0 or 1 is trivial). 
The cases in Proposition 1 have an attractive geometric interpretation: The support points are simply 
the intersections of f(Xt) with the 45º line in Figure 4. That is, the support points are {x : f(x) = x}.3 
Visually, p and r shift and stretch the step function; as a result, it has either one intersection occurring 
below f(Xt) = 0.5 (Case 1), one intersection occurring above f(Xt) =0.5 (Case 3), or both (Case 2). 
Corollary 1. Chance and winning the market. In Case 2, P(limt→∞Xt<½)>0 and P(limt→∞Xt>½) >0.  
This is evident because l <0.5 and h > 0.5 are both support points. This shows an interesting aspect of 
Case 2: regardless of the initial p, either product can obtain and maintain the majority share. 
With the limiting value(s) of {Xt} known, we ask whether they reflect higher or lower concentration. 
Let the term “increased concentration” define shares that are less equal than they would be without 
recommendations. Increased concentration means limt→∞ Xt > p when p > ½ and limt→∞ Xt < p when p < 
½. The effect on concentration is given by the following proposition. 
Proposition 2.  Relation of limit points to concentration. For any (p,r), the effect on concentration is  
Case Support points Effect on concentration relative to p 
1 l Increased concentration 
2 2 Case 2A: ),( 2
1
2
1
rr
rp −−
−∈ . Increased concentration for both support points 
Case 2B: ),( 2
1
2
1
rr
rp −−
−∉ . Increased concentration for one support point; decreased 
for the other  
3 1 Increased concentration 
These cases are shown visually in Figure 5. For Cases 1 and 3, there is a single outcome and that 
outcome always has increased concentration. These are areas of the p×r space where consumers have 
                                                                 
3 The visual interpretation applies only to where f’s line segments intersect the 45º line (not the single point at Xt = 0.5).  
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strong initial probability (p) relative to the recommender’s strength (r); as a result, the recommender’s 
effect is to reinforce this tendency even more. For example, if consumers have a fairly strong tendency to 
buy w with p = .90 and the recommender is fairly influential with r = .25, the recommender creates a 
positive feedback loop, reinforcing the popularity of w and giving it a limit share of 0.93 > 0.90. Product 
w was initially bought more, which made it recommended more, which made it bought more, and so on. 
Case 2A occurs where the recommender’s influence (r) is high relative to the initial probability (p). 
This has two implications, one at the sample-path and one at the aggregate level. At the sample path level, 
either product can win the market, regardless of p. For example, p = 0.55 and r = 0.75 imply limiting 
market shares of (w,b)  ∈ {(0.89,0.11), (0.14,0.86)}. In the first outcome, w wins the market. In the 
second, b wins, even though p = 0.55 initially favored w (c.f. Corollary 1). This occurs because r is large 
relative to p, and the recommender reinforces whichever product does well early on without too much 
resistance from p. This leads to the finding that recommenders can create hits. Some product will become 
a winner with a permanent, majority share, but we cannot say which beforehand. At the aggregate level, 
concentration always increases. We do not know which of w or b will win, but we know that one will and 
whichever does will be an outcome with greater concentration.4 
Last, in Case 2B, neither the initial probability (p) nor the recommender’s influence (r) are strong 
relative to one another. As a result, two outcomes are possible. The tendency p can be reinforced by the 
recommender. This increases concentration. Or, the recommender can give whichever product was not 
favored a small majority. This decreases concentration. For example, if p = .60, which is a mild 
preference for w, and r = .25, which is low, the limit points are .70 and .45. Often w has more early 
successes and the recommender reinforces this, leading to the .70 outcome. In some cases, if b is chosen 
enough early on, the recommender reinforces b leading to the .45 outcome, which entails less 
concentration than the initial share of .40.  
                                                                 
4 Although they start with different models, a similar phenomenon occurs in other contexts (e.g., studies of firm location). Arthur 
(1994) provides an overview of applications, while several underlying mathematical results are in Hill (1980)  
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Figure 5. Relating the p×r space to concentration 
effects (numbers refer to cases in Proposition 2). 
Figure 6. Concentration increases in white 
areas and decreases in shaded ones. 
 
While both outcomes are possible in 2B, they are not equally likely. Next we determine the probability of 
arriving at each. This, in turn, allows us to calculate the expected effect on concentration.  
Proposition 3. The distribution of limt→∞ Xt is 
 
Case 
Support 
point 1 
Support 
point 2 
P(limt→∞ Xt = 
support point 1) 
P(limt→∞ Xt = 
support point 2) 
1. )1/()( 2
1 rrp −−≤  l   1 0 
2. )1/()1/()( 2
1
2
1 rprr −<<−−  l  h  γ 1 – γ 
3. )1/(2
1 rp −≥  h   1 0 
where 
( )
( ) ( ) )1,0(1)1(1
1)1(
1
1
1 ∈−⋅−+−⋅
−⋅−=
−
−
−
l
l
h
h
l
l
mm
mγ . This proposition will be applied subsequently. 
4.2.2 Graphical example 
A graphical example helps illustrate the results. For sake of illustration, take p = .70 and r = .50. Figure 7 
plots 10 realizations of this process over time. The left part of the figure shows these paths converging to 
two outcomes. Visually, one sees the limits are in accord with Proposition 1, which says the process 
converges to a random variable whose support is {0.35, 0.85}. At right, the figure shows that the 
frequencies of arriving at the lower versus upper outcome approach .27 and .73 respectively which is in 
accord with Proposition 3. 
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Figure 7. The two limiting outcomes for our example f(x) 
4.2.3 Net effect on sales concentration 
With the limiting distribution of {Xt} known, we complete the connection to sales concentration. For two 
products with shares p and 1–p, the Gini coefficient is proportional to (Sen 1976) 
 G(p) = |p – ½ | (3) 
With recommendations, we define 
 
 
 
Gp,r   = E[G(limt→∞ Xt ) |  p,r]   
  = G(l)P(limt→∞ Xt = l) + G(h)P(limt→∞ Xt = h) 
 
(4) 
The net effect on concentration is given by Gp,r – Gp,0, which is >0 (<0) when concentration increases 
(decreases). Substituting into (3) and (4) terms from the previous propositions gives 
 Case Gp,r Gp,0 
1 )1/()( 2
1 rrp −−≤  |l – ½| |p – ½ | 
2 )1/()1/()( 2
1
2
1 rprr −<<−− |l – ½|γ + |h – ½|(1 – γ) |p – ½ | 
3 )1/(2
1 rp −≥  |h – ½|  |p – ½ | 
   
 
The above gives a closed-form expression for the change in Gini coefficient. Figure 6 shows this visually. 
For most of the p×r square, concentration increases. This is true, of course, for areas under Case 1, 2A, 
and 3, where the only possibility was increased concentration. It is also true for most areas where both 
outcomes were possible (Case 2B). In extreme cases, it is possible for a net decrease to occur, as shown 
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by the shading. These areas are largely an artifact of the initial conditions assumed for urn 2, which place 
one w and one b in a high r recommender even when p ≈ 0 or  ≈ 1. 5 
We now summarize the findings of this section. Under recommendations, the shares converge to 
either one or two limiting outcomes depending on (p,r). When there is one outcome, it always reflects 
increased concentration; the recommender reinforces the popularity of the initially preferred product. In 
the two outcome cases, either both outcomes have greater concentration or one has greater concentration 
and the other has less. For the latter, a net effect must be calculated. This typically has greater 
concentration, although for extreme (p,r), as discussed, increased diversity may occur. Thus the 
recommender seems to increase concentration among a set of similar users.  
The conclusions of this section are based on a stylized model of recommenders in a context with two 
products and a set of similar users that are aware of both products. To increase their realism, we now use 
simulation to combine multi-product choice models with actual recommender system implementations.  
5. SIMULATIONS 
5.1 Rationale for Simulation 
Simulation offers three benefits for this problem. First, while actual recommender algorithms are difficult 
to represent analytically, they can be easily implemented in simulation. Second, a challenge in analytic 
models is heterogeneity. Heterogeneity can enter in two ways: users can have different preferences over 
products and the recommender can respond differently to each user. Both can be accommodated in 
simulation. Third, more complex choice processes can be represented than in the urn specification.  
5.2 Choice Model and Simulation Design 
We investigate the sales diversity question by using a simulation that combines a choice model with 
actual recommender systems. We assume the number of products supplied is fixed and that repeat 
                                                                 
5  An example illustrates how this is related to initial conditions. Suppose p = 0.99, and r = .99, which is in the shaded region. 
Since X1 = .50, P(b on first purchase) ≈ .50. If b is chosen, the recommender next suggests b; since r = .99 the next consumer is 
almost certain to pick b too, and so on for the remaining consumers even though p = 0.99 favors w. We have conducted 
experiments where the initial conditions are determined by k Bernoulli(p) trials. In such cases, the shaded areas begin to fill in 
for even small k. (These additional experiments are available from the authors on request.) 
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purchases are permitted. Examples of contexts with repeat purchases could include music and video 
streaming from a subscription service (e.g., Rhapsody). 
An overview of the process is as follows. There are I consumers and J products positioned in an 
attribute space. Consumers are not aware of all products. Each consumer knows most of the central 
products and a small number of products in his own neighborhood. Every period, a consumer either 
purchases one of the products or makes no purchase at all. To model this choice, a multinomial logit is 
used for J products plus an outside good. Just before choosing a product, a recommendation is generated. 
The recommender has two effects. First, the consumer becomes aware of the recommended product if he 
was not already. This increase in awareness is permanent. Second, the salience of the recommended 
product is raised temporarily, increasing the chance that the recommended product is purchased. The next 
consumer makes a purchase in a similar manner, and the process repeats after all consumers have 
purchased. After a predetermined number of iterations, the Gini is computed. The Gini is then compared 
to a benchmark G0, the Gini from an equivalent period in which recommendations were not offered. 
We now discuss each of the simulation components: (i) the map of product and consumer points, (ii) 
the recommender system r, (iii) the awareness distribution, (iv) the choice model, and (v) the salience 
factor δ. 
 (i) Map of product and consumer points. The map of products and ideal points is the input for the 
choice model. Plotting consumer points and product locations goes back at least to Hotelling (1929) and 
is commonly used in marketing (e.g., Elrod & Keane 1995). Our consumers and products are points in a 
two-dimensional space. The use of two dimensions is for simplicity and visualization; for contexts with 
more than two attributes, the maps can be considered dimensionality-reduced versions, as is common in 
marketing research. We take both ideal points and products to be standard multivariate normal. The 
normality assumption for consumers is common in factor-analytic market maps (e.g., Elrod 1988; Elrod 
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& Keane 1995). Our base case uses 50 consumer and 50 product points, an example of which is shown 
visually in Figure 8.6  
  
Figure 8. Map of product and consumer 
points 
Figure 9. Map with high density awareness 
regions shaded for one customer 
 (ii) The recommender system. A main advantage of simulation is the ability to test real recommender 
systems. Our base case examines sales diversity under two systems, termed here r1 and r2. In the 
taxonomy of Adomavicius and Tuzhilin (2005), both are memory-based, collaborative filters. 
Recommender r1 is the most basic collaborative filter: for a given user, it first finds the set N* of the n 
most similar customers by using cosine similarity to compare vectors of purchase counts. It then 
recommends the most popular item among this group.7 Formally, let sales be an I users × J items matrix 
of purchase counts, with salesij the (i,j) element, salesi the row vector of user ci’s purchases, and sales(j) 
the column vector of product pj’s sales. For a given user ci, let  
 N*  := ∑
∈Nc
ji
N
j
salessales  ),cos( argmax  such that  |N| = n, i ≠ j (5) 
The system then recommends product  
                                                                 
6 We have tested sensitivity to different numbers of consumers and products, higher dimensions, and other distributions (e.g., 
uniform, normal, and Pareto for each combination of consumers and products as well as normal mixture distributions to 
introduce the idea of segments). The specific Gini values vary, but the conclusions are qualitatively similar. The main 
sensitivity results are in the online appendix. 
7 An alternative is to use correlation (i.e. cosine on mean-centered data) to find the set of most similar users. We have tested 
both, and this does not qualitatively affect the results. 
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 r1: ∑
∈
=
*
  maxarg*
Nc
ij
j
i
salesj   (6) 
Recommender r2 has one difference. When selecting the most popular product among similar users, 
candidate items are first discounted by their overall popularity in the entire population: 
 
r2: ∑
∈
=
*)(
* 1  maxarg
Nc
ij
jj i
sales
sales
j   
(7) 
The motivation for r2’s popularity discounting is a belief that popular items are so obvious they should 
not be suggested. For example, if a consumer is expected to buy or be aware of a product with high 
probability, the firm should recommend something else if it wishes to generate incremental sales. 
Interviews with industry experts suggested such popularity discounting is common practice. Note, r2 is 
not the same as applying “term-frequency inverse-document frequency” weights (tf-idf) to algorithm r1. 
tf-idf would insert discounting in the user similarity calculation (Breese et al. 1998), whereas r2 computes 
an undiscounted user similarity and discounts popularity in the final argmax of (7). In Section 7, we test 
other recommenders, including one with tf-idf weights, and show the results are directionally the same. 
(iii) Awareness. Recommenders are valuable to consumers because they help overcome information 
asymmetry: the seller and other users may know of a product, but the given consumer may not. 
Recommenders share this information across the population. We assume each consumer is aware of a 
subset of  the J products, and only items in his awareness set can be purchased. Once an item is 
recommended to a consumer, he is always aware of it in future periods. At the start, consumers are aware 
of many of the central products on the map plus a few items in their own neighborhood. These initial 
awareness states {0,1} for each consumer-product pair are sampled according to 
 κθθ λλ /distance/distance 220 )1() of aware ( ijj eepcP ji −− −+=  (8) 
Above, distance0j and distanceij are respectively the Euclidean distances from the origin to product pj and 
from consumer ci to product pj. The higher is λ, the more users are aware of central, mainstream products 
(left term), and the higher is 1 – λ the more users are aware of products in their neighborhood. θ and κθ 
are scaling parameters, determining how fast awareness decays with distance. Note that the users are not 
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aware of the same products: they are likely to overlap in their awareness of the central products but less 
so in the local products.  
The awareness model for one consumer is shown visually in Figure 9 for λ=.75, θ=.35, and κ=1/3. 
We use these values for our base case. Setting λ=.75 creates a market with consumers more aware of 
mainstream goods than niche ones. This assumption is consistent with a hit-oriented market or one in 
which mass advertising makes consumers aware of mainstream products. Under the opposite (λ < .5), the 
base-case is already a market of niches and it only strengthens later results that diversity can decrease. θ 
determines how many central products users know. Setting θ=.35 creates an easy to understand “radius 1” 
rule: e-1/.35 = .057 ≈  0. In other words, outside a radius of 1, the consumer is unlikely to be aware of the 
product. In our maps, about 40% of the products are within 1 unit from the origin; it is on this 40% of 
products that consumers are likely to overlap most in their awareness. The value κ determines awareness 
in the consumer’s own neighborhood. The value κ=1/3 creates roughly a 0.5 radius rule. Outside the 0.5 
radius, the consumer is unlikely to know about products, unless they are the central ones. The approach in 
selecting these parameters was to create an interpretable base case. In sensitivity analysis, we find the 
Gini can change for other parameter values but the results are directionally the same.8  
 (iv) Choice model. At each step of the simulation, a consumer either purchases an item in his 
awareness set or makes no purchase at all. We model this using the multinomial logit. The logit is well 
established in economics and marketing and has an axiomatic origin in random utility theory (for a 
Marketing application, see Guadagni & Little 1983). Consumer ci’s utility for product pj at time t is 
defined as uijt := vijt + εijt, where vijt is a deterministic component and εijt is an i.i.d. random variable with 
extreme value distribution. Under these assumptions 
P(ci buys pj at t | ci aware of pj at t) = ∑ =Jk v
v
ikt
ijt
e
e
1
    (9) 
                                                                 
8 If consumers know only the central products (λ=1) the results are directionally the same. If consumers are aware of all products 
(θ→∞), the results are the same direction as well. The same holds if awareness is Pareto distributed instead of normal. These 
results are in the online appendix. 
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The unconditional probability is defined P(ci buys pj at t) = P(ci aware of pj at t)P(ci buys pj at t | ci aware 
of pj at t).  If a consumer is unaware of a product, the left term is zero, and he cannot buy it. 
The deterministic component vijt is often modeled as a linear combination of a brand intercept, 
product attributes, and/or market-related covariates (e.g., price, promotion). In our context, since all 
relevant variables up to white noise are encompassed in the map of products and consumer points, we 
define the deterministic portion: 
vijt := similarityij = -k log distanceij        (10) 
where distanceij is the Euclidean distance between consumer ci and product pj. Our choice of a log 
transformation from distance to similarity is consistent with prior research (e.g., Schweidel et al. 2007).9  
The parameter k determines the consumer’s sensitivity to distance on the map. The higher is k, the 
more the consumer only prefers the closest products. For our base case, as k ranges from 1 to 40, the Gini 
increases from .68 to .75. This range is consistent with several prior estimates of market concentration in 
media and e-commerce settings. An estimate for a major online clothing retailer is 0.70 (Brynjolfsson et 
al. 2007), an estimate for the music sales of debut albums is 0.724 (Hendricks & Sorensen 2007)10, and an 
estimate for the online book market is also near 0.75 (Chevalier & Goolsbee 2003)11. To fix a base case, 
we use k = 10 because the 0.72 Gini it produces matches the average of the estimates above. This k forms 
our base case. For other values, the results change in magnitude but not direction. 
Last, as noted, consumers may choose not to purchase at all. This is modeled by an outside good 
having the same distance to all users. The outside good approach is one common specification for 
modeling a no-purchase option (e.g., Chintagunta 2002). Our base cases uses a distance of .75 for this 
option, which implies the outside good’s proximity is about 90th percentile (.87) for each consumer. That 
                                                                 
9 Other transformations have been used, and the literature does not have a single standard: for example, –k⋅distanceij in Elrod 
(1988); (distanceij)-k in DeSarbo and Wu (2001); and -k⋅log(distanceij) in Schweidel et al. (2007) with k a scaling parameter. 
While our base case uses the log transformation (e.g., Schweidel et al. (2007) and other references contained therein), we have 
tested sensitivity to the other specifications, and the results are not substantively different.  
10 The .724 could underestimate concentration because the authors’ data excludes less successful artists. This may not affect their 
objective, which differs from that in this paper. 
11 The Zipf formulation can be equated to a power law, and from the power law a closed form expression for the Gini can be 
derived. A rank-on-sales coefficient of 1.17 in a power law implies a Gini of (2×1.17 – 1)-1 = 0.75. 
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is, for each person, the outside good is closer than roughly 90% of the other goods. This means consumers 
have a fairly good outside option. If the outside good is farther, diversity in the base case increases: 
consumers substitute farther products for the outside good. The change in Gini under recommendations, 
however, is in the same direction. 
(v) Salience δ. The term δ is the amount by which a recommended product’s salience is temporarily 
increased in the consumer’s choice set. The impact of the salience boost is that the purchase probability 
for the recommended item j is the same as that for an item 'j  with δ+= ijij vv ' . The functional form is 
analogous to the modeling of store displays in marketing (e.g., Guadagni & Little 1983), which might be 
considered an offline example of recommendations. The resulting choice probability is P(ci buys pj at t | ci 
aware of pj at t) = ( ) 1−≠ +∑ ijtiktijt vik vv eeeee δδ . 
When δ = 0, the recommender has a pure awareness effect. Recommended items enter the awareness 
set if not there already. When δ > 0, the recommender also has a salience effect, which increases the 
probability of buying the item (conditional on awareness). The salience effect may exist for several 
reasons. First, consumers aware of many goods may have difficulty comparing all of them; recommended 
items become more salient in this comparison. Second, the salience boost may reflect the ease of clicking 
a recommended item versus continuing to search through a firm’s website. Last, salience may capture 
persuasive effects. Recommendations often show an item’s packaging and artwork, akin to a persuasive 
advertisement. We assume the combined effect is to increase salience through δ. Experiments have begun 
to demonstrate that recommendations can have influential effects beyond awareness (Senecal & Nantel 
2004). This simultaneity of both effects, awareness and salience, has parallels with advertising’s 
informative and persuasive effects (e.g., Narayanan et al. 2005).  
The salience term δ is a key parameter because it controls the strength of the recommender. For this 
reason, the paper’s main results will be shown for a range of δ and not a single point. To give some 
intuition for δ, consider the purchase probability of the 75th percentile closest item on the map (with 50 
products, this is the 13th closest item). In our normal maps, if δ = 0 the user chooses item 13 with <10-4 ≈ 
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0 chance. Item 1 is purchased with probability 0.85. If the 75th percentile item is recommended, for δ = 
(1, 5, 10, 15) the item takes on purchase probability (<10-3, <.01, .15, and .48) respectively. Thus δ = 0-1 
is low, for it has little effect on purchase probability. A value δ=15 is rather high, for it makes a close item 
(100th percentile) and far item (75th percentile) equal in probability.  
6. RESULTS 
We now present simulation results for the two real-world recommenders. We use 50 consumer points and 
50 products sampled from a bivariate normal N2(0,I) with k = 10. Each simulation is 50 iterations without 
recommendations and 50 iterations with recommendations. 
6.1 Example of a Single Sample Path 
Before presenting overall results, we illustrate the process with one sample run. At first, recommendations 
are disabled and customers make purchases for 200 periods. Then r1 is enabled and customers make 
purchases for an additional 200 periods. For sake of illustration, δ = 5, but more general results follow. 
The Lorenz curves and Ginis from both periods are shown in Figure 10. The example shows G1 – G0 =  
0.82 – 0.72 = 0.10 > 0, and hence r1 increases concentration here. This is for one sample path, and a more 
systematic comparison is given below. 
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Figure 10. One sample path: before and after recommendations (r1, δ=5) 
6.2 Simulation Results 
With the same parameters as above, we average results across 1000 experiments/maps each for r1 and r2. 
After, we generalize the findings beyond the base case of δ = 5. 
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As Table 1 shows, both recommenders have a concentration bias on average, as reflected by 1G  > 2G  
> 0G  (0.81 > 0.74 > 0.72). The “standard” collaborative filter r1
 has the larger bias. It is not surprising that 
1G  > 2G  because r2 explicitly discounts popularity. However, we do find it surprising that 2G > 0G : 
beforehand, we could not rule out the possibility of r2’s discounting leading to lower concentration. In 
fact, in a small number of runs (16%), r2 increases diversity, but in the majority of runs (84%) and on 
average it reduces diversity. A t-test of paired differences for unequal means (pre versus post 
recommendations) shows the differences are significant.  
For r1, this is partly explained by (6), in which popularity determines what product is recommended. 
This creates a self-reinforcing cycle: popular items are recommended more, items recommended more are 
purchased more, purchased items are recommended more, and so on. Despite this, the increased 
concentration was not readily obvious: recommendations are generated in many local user groups, making 
a priori conclusions difficult. While r2 dampens the popularity bias, the result also originates from using 
only sales data to make recommendations. Products with limited historical sales have little or no chance 
of being recommended even if they would be favorably received by the consumer. 
Figure 11 shows the change in Gini for a range of δ. When the recommender has both awareness and 
salience effects, concentration increases in δ. The effect is most pronounced at high δ, where by 
construction the recommender has a bigger effect. In the special case δ = 0, the recommender has only 
awareness effects. System r1 continues to increase concentration, although by much less (+1.4%), as seen 
in Figure 11. The positive feedback loop is weakened: even if popular items are recommended more, 
recommended items are not necessarily purchased more because δ = 0. As a result, the Gini’s increase is 
attenuated. With r2, diversity increases under δ = 0, although the magnitude is small (-1.4%) as shown in 
Figure 11. The deliberate exploration of r2 coupled with low salience of recommendations increases 
diversity.  
To summarize, when recommenders have both effects, diversity generally decreases. When 
recommenders affect only awareness, diversity decreases slightly for r1 and increases slightly for r2. The δ 
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= 0 case is of conceptual interest, although it may not be commonplace if it is difficult to show consumers 
information without influencing them. As an example, the experiments of Senecal and Nantel (2004) 
show recommendations are influential even when consumers are aware of all products.  
Table 1. Comparison of r1 and r2 for δ = 5 (1000 experiments; parentheses give standard errors) 
 
 Average Gini Average unique items aware of per person (AUIAP) 
Average unique items 
bought per person (AUIBP) 
 r1 r2 r1 r2 r1 r2 
Before 0.72 (.05) 0.72 (.05) 5.98 (1.33) 5.98 (1.33) 1.67 (0.32) 1.67 (0.32) 
After 0.81 (.03) 0.74 (.04) 6.33 (1.34) 6.79 (1.41) 1.47 (0.17) 1.83 (0.26) 
Change* +0.09 (.03) +0.02 (.02) +0.37 (0.14) +0.79 (0.24) -0.20 (0.23) +0.15 (0.25) 
* Change reports the average paired difference. T-test of paired differences is significant (<.05) for the bottom row.  
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Figure 11. Change in Gini by recommender and salience level (δ) 
 
6.3 Further Discussion of the Results 
This section contrasts aggregate versus individual-level diversity, product-level effects, and consumer-
level effects. These three aspects give a better understanding of the model’s mechanics and properties. 
(i) Aggregate versus individual effects. Table 1’s middle section shows the average unique items 
aware of per person (AUIAP). This quantity increases under recommendations. Systems r2, as expected, 
creates a bigger increase, but in general both inform consumers of new products. Combining this 
observation with the change in Gini is revealing. Individually, consumers learn of more products (higher 
AUIAP), yet in aggregate diversity can decrease (higher Gini). This may explain users’ anecdotes that 
recommenders create diversity even when an aggregate statistic, the Gini, reports more concentration.  
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A similar effect is seen in Table 1’s right panel. This panel reports the average unique items 
bought per person (AUIBP). Under r1, consumers buy a narrower range of items, as seen by the lower 
AUIBP. Under r2, the outcome is different: AUIBP increases. Consumers are pushed toward products that 
are not necessarily popular, which means they are less likely to have bought them previously. The Gini, 
however, still increases. This again leads to the finding that individual diversity can increase while 
aggregate diversity decreases. Consumers are discovering new products, but they are discovering the 
same products others have bought.  
(ii) Product-level view. Figure 12 shows how the market share of particular products is affected by the 
recommender. Each point represents a product, with the x coordinate giving the product’s market share 
before recommendations and the y-coordinate giving its share after. With recommendations, there is a 
systematic dispersion off the 45-degree line. The concentration bias is especially clear with r1. Low share 
products become even lower, which is shown by the mass of points in the lower-left, and high share 
products become even higher, as seen by the mass of points in the upper-right. This reflects a ‘poor get 
poorer’ and ‘rich get richer’ phenomenon, both of which contribute to the increased Gini. The lower 
portion is related to the “cold-start” problem of collaborative filters, in which unpurchased/unrated items 
cannot be recommended (Schein et al. 2002). While the bias is not as acute with r2, the high share 
products are likely to gain more share in this case as well. It is interesting to note that the positive 
feedback effect of recommendations can turn some medium selling products into high selling ones, which 
is consistent with the findings from the urn model in Section 4. As long as a product has modest sales, 
recommendations have the potential to make it more successful.  
  
25
 
Share After (r 1)
0%
10%
20%
0% 10%Share Before
Y=X
 
Share After (r 2)
0%
10%
20%
0% 10%Share Before
Y=X
 
Figure 12. Market shares by product (δ=5). Each point is a product whose coordinates give its 
market share before versus after recommendations. (Data pooled across 10 experiments) 
 
(iii) Consumer-level view. The recommender systems push consumers toward the same products, and 
thus make consumers more similar in their purchases. This is illustrated in Figure 13. In the graph, 
consumers are nodes equally spaced on the perimeter of a circle. An edge joins consumers ),( ji cc  if 
correlation(salesi salesj) > 0. The correlation is calculated over users’ purchase counts for all items. 
Visually, the edge’s thickness is proportional to the correlation. Comparing the graphs, the increased 
density at right shows that consumers have become more similar to one another in terms of products they 
consume. The figure alone does not imply the Gini has increased. For example, a correlation of 1 among 
all users could occur if everyone bought a single product (Gini=1), but it could also occur if all users 
bought all items equally (Gini=0). On its own, the figure shows consumers have become more alike. 
Combining this with the increased Gini, we see the complete picture: users are more similar (from Figure 
13), and the items they purchase come from a smaller, more popular set (Ginis in Table 1). 
 
         Before Recommendations After Recommendations 
Figure 13. Consumer similarity (δ=5, r1). Each point is a user. Users with common purchases are 
connected. Edge thickness is proportional to the number of items the two users have in common. 
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7. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
We next examine our results under other possible assumptions. We approach this in four parts: alternate 
recommender systems; bestseller lists in the base case; variety seeking in the utility specification, and 
alternate parameter values. 
7.1 Alternate Recommender Systems 
The base case examined two recommenders that were considered representative of industry practice. This 
section tests additional systems. A comparison of eight recommenders ri (i=1,...,8) is given in Table 2. As 
before, we make comparisons of the form E[G0] ≈ 0G  (Gini without recommendations) versus E[Gi] ≈ iG  
(Gini under ri).  
The recommenders tested are as follows. r1 and r2 are as before. r3 is another popularity-discounting 
variation on r1 (Breese et al. 1998). It places discounting in the user similarity calculation but not the 
product selection calculation. (i.e. r2 and r3 add discounting in opposite places). Specifically, in (5) the 
user-item frequencies are multiplied by the inverse of each item’s total sales (known as the “inverse 
document frequency” (idf) in the field of information retrieval); once the similar user group is determined, 
the undiscounted argmax of (6) is used. This still leads to an increase in the Gini. The magnitude is 
similar to r1’s increase for the following reason. The intention of r3 is to prevent latently different users 
with little purchase history from being grouped together (e.g., two users who each bought Harry Potter 
and one very different item). Because of the initialization period, our users have several purchases, and so 
the similar user-groups under r1 and r3 are often similar (and hence 1G ≈ 3G ). System r4 is a combination 
of r2 and r3: discounting is performed in both the user similarity calculation and argmax. As with its 
parents, r4 also lowers diversity. 
To build context for these comparisons, we tested four other designs (r5 – r8). System r5 recommends 
the lowest sales product. As expected, it decreases the Gini. System r6 recommends the median selling 
product. It also reduces the Gini because it diverts attention from otherwise higher selling products. 
System r7 recommends the best-selling product and as expected increases the Gini. We highlight that the 
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Gini under r7 is not higher than under r1.  A single product, the best seller, cannot be close to everyone. 
As a result, fewer users accept r7’s recommendations, limiting its influence. In contrast, r1 recommends 
local best-sellers, which are closer to each user and thus accepted more. r8 is a best-seller list, which 
recommends the top 5 selling items. This system has the highest concentration: it shows the most popular 
items, and by showing multiple items increases the chance that at least one is close to the user and thus 
accepted. Similar results were confirmed experimentally by Salganik et al. (2006).  
Table 2. Comparison of additional recommenders (30 experiments).  
 
 r1 r2 r3 r4 
 “Standard” CF r1 + argmax discount r1 + idf weights r2 and r3 combined 
iG  0.81 (0.03) 0.74 (0.05) 0.81 (0.03) 0.74 (0.05) 
0GGi − * +0.09 (0.03) +0.02 (0.02) +0.09 (0.03) +0.02 (0.02) 
 r5 r6 r7 r8 
 Lowest Median Best-Seller  Best-Seller List (Top 5) 
iG  0.45 (0.10) 0.61 (0.03) 0.81 (0.04) 0.85 (0.03) 
0GGi − * -0.27 (0.10) -0.11 (0.04) +0.09 (0.02) +0.14 (0.04) 
* All results are significant at the 0.05 level (two-sided, paired differences t-test for unequal means). For 
all results, the no recommendations case has 0G = 0.72 (0.05). 
 
7.2 Bestsellers in the Base Case (Alternate Recommender Systems) 
Without recommender systems, consumers might obtain product suggestions from best-seller 
lists. If the base case is driven by best-seller lists, any force that pulls consumers away from this influence 
would be expected to reduce concentration. We model this by introducing a best-seller list in the base 
case. This is equivalent to r8 from the previous subsection – only that r8  is now the control and r1 or r2 the 
treatment. Viewed this way, if recommenders are substituting for purely popularity-based filters, such as 
best-seller lists, they can increase diversity: 1G < 8G  (0.82 < 0.85) and 2G < 8G  (0.75 < 0.85). Although 
it is unlikely that best-seller lists drive purchase decisions in all product categories, it seems feasible that 
bestseller lists may be major drivers of purchase decisions in the absence of recommenders in at least 
some product categories. If so, this implies the role of recommenders is misunderstood. Relative to an 
‘older’ world of bestseller lists, recommenders may reduce concentration, by virtue of cutting out the 
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even more popularity-biased tool ( 1G , 2G < 8G ). But relative to a world  without such lists, 
recommenders may increase concentration ( 1G , 2G  > 0G ).   
7.3 Modifying the Utility Specification: Variety Seeking  
Since the choice model allowed for repeat purchases, we ask whether the concentration results are 
affected if consumers seek variety across purchase occasions. The concept of state dependence has a long 
history in choice models (e.g., McAlister 1982). “Structural state dependence” (Seetharaman 2004) is the 
extent to which prior purchases of a product affect its future purchase propensity; positive dependence is 
termed inertia, while negative dependence is termed variety seeking.  
To incorporate variety and inertia in the specification, we use a common approach and define 
vijt := -k log distanceij + βXijt 
Xijt := αXijt-1 + (1 – α)I(ci bought pj on t – 1) 
Xijt is an exponential smooth of purchase indicators I( ), and thus it summarizes how often and recently ci 
has bought pj. The parameter α ∈ (0,1) determines how much weight is placed on recent versus distant 
purchase occasions. β determines the effect strength, with β  < 0 for variety seeking, and β > 0 for intertia. 
This approach has been used frequently in the literature (e.g., see Guadagni & Little 1983; Seetharaman 
2004). Past empirical studies have found consistent values of α in the range 0.70-0.80, and thus we set α 
= 0.75 (Guadagni & Little 1983; Lattin 1987; Seetharaman 2004). For β, we consider a range of values to 
explore both variety-seeking and inertia.12 The β term is not applied to the outside good, which by 
definition has the same distance to all consumers at all times. 
Table 3 shows the Gini under state dependence. Under inertia (β > 0), the findings are directionally 
the same as before: concentration increases. As β increases, the change in Gini dampens. Under high 
inertia, consumers do not want to deviate from their choices in the pre-recommendation period, and so the 
recommender’s influence becomes limited. Under variety seeking (β < 0), concentration still increases for 
                                                                 
12 An alternative approach could replace Xijt with a smooth on attribute levels of goods previously consumed (e.g., Lattin 1987). 
Our model uses an exponential smooth of purchase indicators, a common approach. 
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r1 but by less. r1 suggests heavily purchased items, which are less likely to provide variety. As a result, 
users ignore recommendations that are too similar, and the change in Gini is lessened. For r2, at moderate 
levels of variety seeking (e.g., β = -5) concentration still increases. At strong levels of variety seeking, the 
Gini can decrease.  For example, at β = -20, the Gini drops .03 points. We note first that this level of 
variety seeking is high. Suppose ci buys pj semi-frequently so that Xijt = 0.5 at some time. β = -20 implies 
βXijt = (-20)(0.5) = -10, which is twice as strong as the δ = 5 salience effect of recommendations. Under 
such high variety seeking, the Gini decreases because users ignore recommendations of popular items and 
selectively accept recommendations of less popular ones. Whereas r1 cannot supply these selectively 
accepted recommendations (r1 focuses on past hits), r2 makes this possible. Users want items not 
purchased recently, and r2’s discounting better meets this goal.  
The variety seeking results have an interesting interpretation. If consumers seek recommendations 
only in their most variety-seeking moments, diversity increases under r2. However, as recommenders 
become ubiquitous, consumers are affected by them all the time, not only in one-off, high variety-seeking 
events. This may be the case for sites users visit regularly: for example, personalized news, personalized 
radio, and personalized retail websites. In these cases, increased concentration could be likely.  
Table 3. Gini values under state dependence at δ=5. For variety seeking β < 0, and for inertia β > 0. 
 
β -30 -20 -10 -5 0 5 10 20 30 
01 GG −  +.04 +.05 +.07 +.08 +.09 +.07 +.04 +.02 +.02 
02 GG −  -.04 -.03 -.01 +.01 +.02 +.03 +.02 +.02 +.02 
 
7.4 Altering Other Simulation Parameters 
We also examine sensitivity to other simulation parameters (e.g., number of consumers and products, map 
distributions). The main sensitivity results appear in the appendix, and others are available on request. In 
general, we find that varying these parameters affects the degree of the results (e.g., the Gini may increase 
more versus less), but the substantive findings remain the same.  
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8. WELFARE IMPLICATIONS 
Thus far we have examined how recommenders affect concentration. We next ask whether these changes 
leave firms and consumers better off.  
For firms, we examine the change in sales. For consumers, we examine the change in product fit. The 
consumers’ product fit is defined as the average of -k log distanceijt + εijt over all purchases, including 
those of the outside good. This quantity reflects the map distance between consumers and purchased 
products. Figure 14 shows these quantities. The figure puts the numbers in percent change so that both 
firm and consumer effects can be plotted on the same scale. When δ = 0, the recommender has a pure 
awareness effect. The firm’s sales are higher, and consumers find products closer to them. The gains for 
both parties are larger under r2. The deliberate exploration of r2 helps consumers find better products, 
which translates into higher sales (fewer no-purchases) for the firm. When δ > 0, recommenders have 
both awareness and salience effects. At low δ, the results are the same as δ = 0. At high δ, firms always 
sell more: the greater the salience δ, the more likely the consumer is to buy the recommended product 
than the outside good. For consumers, high δ increases the average map distance of purchases. Consumers 
may forgo a slightly closer product if the recommended product has increased salience. A slightly better 
song or news article may be available deeper in the website, but the recommendation’s salience makes it 
easier to click.  
Percent Change
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
0 5
Salience boost (δ)
––r1
- - r2
Sales
– k·log(distance)+ε
 
Figure 14. Percent changes in consumer and producer surplus for varying levels of salience (δ) 
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Does this mean consumers are worse off when δ > 0? A myopic answer is yes. If the salience 
effect is simply a momentary increase in purchase probability but does not contribute to post-purchase 
satisfaction, then consumers are worse off because their purchases are farther away.  A more complete 
answer considers additional factors. First, it is possible that δ, or part of it, should be included in the 
consumer’s utility. This is the case if recommendations add value to the choice occasion. In this case, the 
consumer effect in Figure 14 becomes positive and increasing (not shown for clarity). This view is 
consistent with several logit applications in marketing in which a store display adds utility to the choice 
occasion (e.g., Guadagni & Little 1983). For example, a display means the user does not have to walk 
down the aisle to get the product or price information. Similarly, choosing the recommended item may 
save time browsing the site or effort in making product comparisons. Second, to the extent media 
products have positive externalities, these may offset the increased distance. For example, watching the 
same movies as others is valuable because it permits discussion. In this case, the recommender serves a 
coordinating role whose value is not fully accounted for in -k log distanceij.  
For firms, we have measured changes in sales. To the extent changes in concentration simplify 
inventory and supply chain management, these factors are also unaccounted for. Last, it should be noted 
that even if recommenders reduce consumer-product distances and increase sales, they may have welfare 
implications at the societal level. Legal scholar Cass Sunstein (2001) discusses the risk of “filters” 
creating a fragmented society. Sunstein asks whether en masse filtering of all but one's specific interests 
will reduce the ability of society’s members to understand each other. Such considerations are beyond the 
current scope, but we raise them to show that an exhaustive analysis of welfare implications will involve 
more than changes in sales and map distances. 
9. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper examined the effect of popular recommender designs on sales concentration and offered 
evidence that recommenders do influence sales diversity. In a range of cases, common recommenders 
were found to exert a concentration bias. Thus the traditional view that recommenders increase diversity 
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may not always hold. The work also demonstrated that some designs may be associated with greater bias 
than others. The results have important managerial and consumer implications. For retailers whose 
strategy is to offer variety, certain system designs may be at odds with that goal. We also find that 
recommenders can increase sales, and recommenders that discount popularity appropriately may increase 
sales more. For consumers, we showed that recommenders can create better (closer) consumer-product 
matches. However, if the recommendations are highly salient and thus influential, popularity-influenced 
recommendations may displace what would otherwise be better product suggestions. Future, empirical 
work would be valuable for determining the relative strength of these awareness versus salience effects. 
Given these findings, why do consumers feel that recommendations have increased the range of 
media they consume? We offered several explanations. The first is that diversity can increase at the 
individual level but still decrease in aggregate. This was borne out under r2, in which each user became 
aware of more items and purchased more unique items, but the Gini still increased. Individuals may be 
exploring more choices, but they are being pushed toward the same choices. Second, if recommenders are 
pulling consumers away from a world of best-seller lists, diversity can increase by virtue of cutting out 
the even more popularity-biased tool. A final possibility is that the effect of increased product offerings 
outweighs the effect of recommenders. Increased offerings may lower concentration (Anderson 2006; 
Brynjolfsson et al. 2007), while recommenders may temper but not reverse the effect. While it is beyond 
the current scope to examine the simultaneous effects of recommenders and increased offerings, this is an 
interesting question for future work.  
A final interesting aspect arose to the extent that externalities exist for media goods. If, for example, 
there is a benefit to reading popular books or seeing popular movies (e.g., by increasing the likelihood of 
being able to discuss the experience with others), then consumer utility involves a tradeoff between a 
Hotelling-like similarity and the externality from a popular product. To the extent such externalities are 
strong, it would be interesting to see if they pose a limit, or upper bound, on the degree of diversity 
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consumers would ever prefer. If this were the case, a concentration bias may be more desirable than 
previously considered. We hope to explore these questions in future work as well.  
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This appendix proves all results stated for the analytic model. In the main paper, the propositions are 
stated in terms of segment market shares (Xt). By noting that a share Xt is just a statistic of the products’ 
sales, results can be derived in a random walks framework since the sales are integer quantities. 
For ease of understanding the derivations, Propositions 2 and 3 are derived in reverse order. The 
numbering is consistent with the main paper, but the order of presentation is reversed. 
 
Before deriving results specific to recommender systems, we need one preliminary result.  
 
For a simple random walk on the integers, let  
 
  S :=   Event {particle at i moves to i+1 on next move} 
θ  :=   P(S) 
i → j   :=   Event {particle at i ever reaches j} 
 
 
Lemma 1. (One-Away Return) 
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Proof.  
 
The above is a basic result from stochastic processes (e.g., Durrett, 2005, p. 294). 
 
Recommendations context 
 
Turning to our context, for which we have products {w, b}, let  
 
  p  :=   P(consumer picks w on own) 
  r  :=   P(consumer follows recommendation) 
 Wt, Bt :=   Total w, b in Urn 2 prior to purchase t   
  Zt  :=   Wt – Bt 
  Xt :=   Wt/(Wt+Bt), which is w’s share before purchase t  
  g(Xt)  :=   P(w recommended at t | Xt) 
 
Thus the chance a consumer selects w at t is  
 
  f(Xt)  :=   P(consumer buys w at t) = p(1 – r) + g(Xt)r 
 
As defined in the main paper, g is a step function. This implements a system that recommends the product 
with majority share.  
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Substituting this g(Xt) into the expression f(Xt) gives 
 
f(Xt)  = ⎪⎩
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The letters l, m, h are shorthand for the expressions at their left. They also have a geometric interpretation: 
f is a modified step function (shifted and stretched), and l, m, and h correspond to the heights of f’s lower 
segment, middle point, and upper segment. This graphical interpretation was shown in the main paper. 
 
While the propositions state results about {Xt}, here we study {Zt}. Studying sales instead of shares 
carries the same information because Xt is a statistic of sales. This switch, however, is beneficial because 
Zt is an integer that changes by one unit each period, and can thus be studied in a random walks 
framework. (The reason for focusing on Zt but not Wt and Bt will become clear below.) 
 
For any time τ at which Zτ = 0 (i.e. Wτ = Bτ), three events are possible 
 
  WB := Event {Zt > 0 for all t > τ  | Zτ = 0 }    
  BW := Event {Zt < 0 for all t > τ  | Zτ = 0 }      
  RTZ  := Event {Zt = 0 for some t > τ  | Zτ = 0 }  
 
In words, WB is the event “w leads black forever after the next draw”; BW is the event “b leads w forever 
after the next draw”; and RTZ is the event “Zt returns to zero at some future time point”. 
 
By the definition of Xt, Zt > 0 ⇒ Xt > ½, Zt < 0 ⇒ Xt < ½, and Zt = 0 ⇒ Xt = ½. Thus the events WB, BW, 
and RTZ can also be interpreted as “white has majority share from the next draw on”, “black has majority 
share from the next draw on”, and “white and black will have equal shares at some future time point”. 
Thus {Zt} carries information about {Xt}; however, {Zt}, unlike{Xt}, changes in increments of one each 
period, and is thus amenable to a random walks framework. 
 
We now have a random walk on Z1 beginning at the origin for which the transition probabilities are (l, 1–
l), (m,1–m), and (h,1–h) depending on whether the particle is left of zero, at zero, or right of zero.  
 
 
Lemma 2. (Never Return Probabilities are always Non-Zero).  
 
For any p ∈ [0,1] and r ∈ (0,1), either P(WB) > 0, P(BW) > 0, or both are > 0. 
 
Thus it is always possible for at least one product to obtain a majority share and never lose it.  
 
Proof. 
 
We prove this by giving probabilities for these events. By conditioning on the first event  
 
P(WB)   = P(Zτ +1 =  1)P(Zt > 0 for t > τ + 1 |Zτ +1 =   1) 
P(BW)   = P(Zτ +1 = -1)P(Zt < 0 for t > τ + 1 |Zτ +1 = -1) 
P(RTZ)  = 1 – P(WB) – P(BW) 
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Because the walk begins at the origin, the terms P(Zτ +1 =  1) and P(Zτ +1 = -1) follow immediately as m 
and 1 – m. For the rightmost terms, Lemma 1 will be needed.  
 
To apply the lemma, as will be seen, we must distinguish three cases. The interpretation of the three cases 
is given in the main paper. Further, we reparameterize the cases from (p,r) notation to (l,h) notation 
because it makes clearer how the lemma is applied. 
 
The change of parameters assumes p ∈ [0,1] and r ∈ (0,1), which is to say the recommender has some 
influence. The boundary case when r = 0 or 1 is of less interest, for it does not concern recommender 
systems, but for completeness it will be discussed afterward.  
 
Case 1.  )1/()( 2
1 rrp −−≤  ⇔  l < ½, h ≤ ½. 
 
P(WB)   = P(Zτ +1 =  1)P(Zt > 0 for t > τ + 1 |Zτ +1 =   1) 
  = )]01(1[ →−⋅ Pm  
= )11( −⋅m  
= 0 
 
P(BW)   = P(Zτ +1 = -1)P(Zt < 0 for t > τ + 1 |Zτ +1 = -1) 
  = )]01(1[)1( →−−⋅− Pm  
    = ( )llm −−⋅− 11)1(  
 
  P(RTZ)  = 1 – P(WB) – P(BW) 
    = 1 – ( )llm −−⋅− 11)1(  
 
Case 2. )1/()1/()( 2121 rprr −<<−−  ⇔ l < ½, h > ½  
 
P(WB)   = P(Zτ +1 =  1)P(Zt > 0 for t > τ + 1 |Zτ +1 =   1) 
  = )]01(1[ →−⋅ Pm  
    = ( )hhm −−⋅ 11  
 
P(BW)   = P(Zτ +1 = -1)P(Zt < 0 for t > τ + 1 |Zτ +1 = -1) 
  = )]01(1[)1( →−−⋅− Pm  
    = ( )llm −−⋅− 11)1(  
 
  P(RTZ)  = 1 – P(WB) – P(BW) 
    = 1 – ( )hhm −−⋅ 11  – ( )llm −−⋅− 11)1(  
 
Case 3. )1/(2
1 rp −≥  when ⇔ l ≥ ½, h > ½ 
 
P(WB)   = P(Zτ +1 =  1)P(Zt > 0 for t > τ + 1 |Zτ +1 =   1) 
  = )]01(1[ →−⋅ Pm  
    = ( )hhm −−⋅ 11  
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P(BW)   = P(Zτ +1 = -1)P(Zt < 0 for t > τ + 1 |Zτ +1 = -1) 
  = )]01(1[)1( →−−⋅− Pm  
    = ( )11)1( −⋅− m  
    = 0 
 
P(RTZ) = 1 – P(WB) – P(BW) 
  = 1 – ( )hhm −−⋅ 11  
 
Reviewing the above expressions shows that for every case either P(WB) > 0, P(BW) > 0, or both are > 0.  
 
□ 
 
Recall that the parameter space is the unit square {(p,r): 0 ≤ p,r ≤ 1}. The above three cases are non-
overlapping and cover the space {(p,r): 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 ∧ 0 < r < 1}. To be exhaustive and cover the entire 
square, we point out the two remaining trivial cases. When r = 0, this gives a Bernoulli process that 
converges to p by the weak law of large numbers. Setting r = 1 forces all consumers to purchase whatever 
was bought on the first occasion, which is w with the chance of a fair coin flip. The resulting behaviors 
are clear, but the model does not apply to recommender systems unless r ∈ (0,1). 
 
The above lemma showed it is always possible for a product to obtain a majority share and never lose it. 
Next we show this must be the case: after sufficient time, one product is guaranteed to develop a majority 
share and maintain. Further, how likely it is for w versus b to obtain such a position is also given next. 
  
 
Lemma 3. (Probability of w versus b obtaining a lasting majority share). 
 
Case limt→∞  P(Zt > 0) limt→∞  P(Zt < 0) limt→∞  P(RTZ) Interpretation 
1 0 1 0 b wins always 
2 1 – γ γ 0 either can win 
3 1 0 0 w wins always 
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Proof. 
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The analogous argument gives 
 
)0(lim <∞→ tt ZP  )()(
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We can also confirm that 
 
  limt→∞  P(RTZ)  
  
  = limt→∞ {1 – P(Zt  > 0) – P(Zt  < 0)} 
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Combining the above expressions with the results from the previous lemma gives 
 
Case limt→∞  P(Zt > 0)   limt→∞  P(Zt < 0)  
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The above result shows that in the limit (i) some product must develop and maintain a majority share and 
(ii) how often w versus b has this lasting majority. We now determine what those limiting shares are.  
 
 
Proposition 1. (Support of limt→∞ Xt). As t→∞ , {Xt} converges to either one or two values given by 
 
 limt→∞ Xt 
Case Outcome 1 Outcome 2 
1 l  n/a 
2 l  h  
3 h  n/a 
 
Proof. 
  
Case 1.  
 
By Lemma 3, limt→∞  P(Zt < 0) = 1.  
 
Thus limt→∞ Xt < ½ because Zt < 0 ⇒ Xt < ½ by the definition of Xt 
 
Because limt→∞ Xt < ½ and f is constant for Xt < ½,  
limt→∞ Xt  = f(Xt | Xt < ½) = l. 
 
In words, because limt→∞  P(Zt < 0) = 1 this implies w always has the minority share. If w has the 
minority share, then limt→∞ Xt must be < ½ by definition. Now f(Xt) = l everywhere on [0, ½). 
Thus after sufficient time, limt→∞ P(Draw w) = f(τ) = l for τ  < ½.  
 
Said differently, if w has the minority share, its chance of being purchased is l; since it was 
proved to remain the minority share product for this case, its limiting share must also be l.  
 
Case 2.  
 
By the previous result, limt→∞  P(Zt > 0) ∈ (0,1), limt→∞  P(Zt > 0) ∈ (0,1), and limt→∞  P(RTZ) = 0. 
Thus either limt→∞  Zt > 0 or limt→∞  Zt < 0. 
 
Suppose we are in a path for which limt→∞  Zt < 0. By the argument for Case 1 above, limt→∞ {Xt  | 
Zt < 0} = l  
 
In contrast, suppose we are in a path for which limt→∞  Zt > 0. By the argument for Case 3 below, 
limt→∞ {Xt  | Zt > 0} = h. 
 
Since one of these outcomes is guaranteed to occur (some product will have a non-reversing 
majority share), then limt→∞ Xt → X where X is a random variable with support {l, h}.  
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Case 3.  
 
By Lemma 3, limt→∞  P(Zt > 0) = 1.  
 
Thus limt→∞ Xt > ½ because Zt > 0 ⇒ Xt > ½ by the definition of Xt 
 
Because limt→∞ Xt > ½ and f is constant for Xt > ½,  
limt→∞ Xt  = f(Xt | Xt > ½) = h 
 
The interpretation is analogous to Case 1 above. 
□ 
 
 
Corollary 1. In Case 2, P(limt→∞ Xt < ½) > 0 and P(limt→∞ Xt > ½) > 0.  
 
Thus regardless of the initial preference p, either product can obtain and maintain a majority share. 
 
Proof.  
 
By Proposition 1, {Xt}→ X where X is a random variable with support },{ hl . Since l < ½ and h > ½, as 
verified next, the result is shown.  
Regarding l , Case 2 defines that 
)1(2
1
r
p −< . Thus  l ≡ p(1 – r) < 2
1
)1(2
)1( =−
−
r
r . 
Regarding h , Case 2 defines that 
)1(
)( 2
1
r
r
p −
−> .  Thus h  ≡ p(1 – r) + r > 
2
1
)1(
)1)(( 2
1
=+−
−−
r
r
rr
. 
□ 
 
Proposition 3. Distribution of limt→∞ Xt. The distribution of limt→∞ Xt is 
 
Case Support 
point 1 
Support 
point 2 
P(limt→∞ Xt = 
support point 1) 
P(limt→∞ Xt = 
support point 2) 
1 l  1 0 
2 l h γ 1 – γ 
3 h  1 0 
 
where 
( )
( ) ( ) )1,0(1)1(1
1)1(
1
1
1 ∈−⋅−+−⋅
−⋅−=
−
−
−
l
l
h
h
l
l
mm
mγ . 
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Proof. 
 
The support points were derived in Proposition 1. The probabilities are determined as follows. For Cases 
1 and 3, we know from Proposition 1 there is convergence to a single outcome; thus chance of converging 
to that particular outcome is 1. For Case 2, by Proposition 1 the process converges to one of two limiting 
outcomes, l and h. By Corollary 1, outcome l means b has majority share and outcome h means w has 
majority share. By Lemma 3, b versus w obtains the majority share with chance γ  versus 1 – γ, which 
means that l and h also occur with probabilities γ and 1 – γ. 
□ 
 
 
Thus far, the lemmas and propositions have been used to derive the distribution of limt→∞ Xt. With the 
limiting behavior of {Xt} understood, we know ask whether that limiting behavior reflects more or less 
concentration. 
 
Proposition 2.  Relation of limit points to concentration.  
 
The term “increased concentration” refers to shares that are less equal than they would be without 
recommendations. Formally, “increased concentration” means limt→∞ Xt > p when p > ½ and limt→∞ Xt 
< p when p < ½ . When p = ½, increased concentration occurs when limt→∞ Xt ≠ p. 
 
As before, we have p∈[0,1] and r∈ (0,1). (The case of r = 0 or 1 was discussed above). The effect on 
concentration is then given by the following: 
 
 Case Support points Effect on concentration relative to p 
1. )1/()( 2
1 rrp −−≤  1 Increased concentration 
2. )1/()1/()( 2
1
2
1 rprr −<<−−  2 
Case 2A: ),( 2
1
2
1
rr
rp −−
−∈ . Increased concentration for both 
support points 
Case 2B: ),( 2
1
2
1
rr
rp −−
−∉ . Increased concentration for one 
support point; decreased for the other  
3. )1/(2
1 rp −≥  1 Increased concentration 
 
Proof. 
 
Case 1.  
 
The process converges to l ≡ p(1 – r) < p. Since p < ½ in Case 1, this implies increased concentration.  
 
To verify that p < ½, start with Case 1’s definition )1/()( 2
1 rrp −−≤ . Viewing p as a function of r, its 
derivative is 22
11 )1)(()1(/ −− −−+−−= rrrdrdp . The condition r ∈ (0,1) implies dp/dr < 0 on (0,1), and 
thus p(r) is maximized as r → 0. Since 2121 )01/()0()0( =−−=p , this bound shows p must be less than ½ 
on the interval (0,1). 
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Case 2. 
 
First consider the case when p < 0.5. The two possible limits are p(1 – r) and p(1 – r) + r. Note that p(1 – 
r) < p, and thus this outcome always involves increased concentration. Now, consider the other outcome 
p(1 – r)  + r. Since Case 2’s definition states )1/()( 2
1 rrp −−> , it follows that p(1 – r)  + r > ½. Clearly, 
this reverses the popularity order of the two products. However, it increases concentration only if 
)1()1( prrp −>+− . Simplifying this expression, concentration increases only if p > )2/()1( rr −− . 
Similarly, for the case in which p > 0.5, concentration increases in both outcomes only if p < 1/(2 – r). 
Combining results, we see that sales concentration always increases if ),( 2
1
2
1
rr
rp −−
−∈ . Otherwise, sales 
concentration increases for one limiting outcome and decreases for another. 
 
 
Case 3. 
 
The process converges to h ≡ p(1 – r) + r = p + r(1 – p) > p. Since p > ½ in Case 3, this implies increased 
concentration. 
 
To verify that p > ½, start with Case 3’s definition )1/(2
1 rp −≥ . Viewing p as a function of r, its 
derivative is 22
1 )1(/ −−= rdrdp . Adding the condition r ∈ (0,1) implies that dp/dr > 0 on (0,1), and thus 
p(r) is minimized as r → 0. Since 2121 )01/()0( =−=p , this bound shows p > ½ on the interval (0,1). 
□ 
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